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ARTICLES
CONTRACTING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
LOOKING TO VERSION 2.0 OF THE
ABA MODEL CONTRACT CLAUSES
SARAH DADUSH*
This Article offers a commentary on the American Bar Association’s initiative to craft
model contract clauses that U.S. buyer companies can include in their contracts with
suppliers. The purpose of the model contract clauses (“MCCs”) is to deepen the protection
of human rights along the supply chain. This Article briefly explains how the MCCs
work and highlights two valuable contributions of the MCCs to the business and human
rights space. First, the MCCs effectively take buyers’ non-binding human rights policies
and put them into practice by incorporating them as contractually enforceable
appendices to the supply agreements. Second, the MCCs serve to relax the legally
outdated distinction between product and process regulation by treating a product’s
human rights conformity as being on contractual par with a product’s technical
conformity (e.g., quantity, size, design). Both of these contributions are hugely beneficial
for purposes of advancing the protection of human rights within global supply chains.
This Article then discusses a central shortcoming of the MCCs, which is that the clauses
shift all responsibility for human rights violations onto the supplier, ignoring the reality
that the buyer’s purchasing practices can be a serious contributing factor to the occurrence
of violations. It concludes with some preliminary recommendations for improving the
MCCs, in anticipation of a possible version 2.0 of the clauses.

* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. I am deeply grateful to Jennifer
Martin and David Snyder for their invitation to participate in the American University
Law Review’s Symposium: New Perspectives: A Discussion on Modern Global Supply
Chains and for their and other participants’ comments on this contribution. I also
extend sincere thanks to the participants of the Business and Human Rights Scholars
Conference (2019), KCON (2019), and Innovate Rights (2019) for their comments
and feedback, and to Tara Richelo for outstanding research assistance.

1519

1520

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1519

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................. 1520
I. The Power of Contract: Innovating for Human
Rights .............................................................................. 1523
A. How Do the MCCs Work? ........................................ 1524
B. What the MCCs Do Well .......................................... 1526
1. Making soft policies hard................................... 1526
2. Relaxing the product/process distinction ........ 1530
II. What the MCCs Do Poorly: Offloading Human
Rights Obligations Onto Suppliers ................................ 1534
A. Entrenching Dangerous Dynamics ......................... 1534
III. Making Better Contracts by Making the Contracting
Parties Better .................................................................. 1546
A. Ex Ante Contractual Regulation ............................. 1547
B. Ex Post Contractual Regulation .............................. 1549
Conclusion ................................................................................ 1553
INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association’s (ABA) 2018 Report on Human
Rights Protections for Workers in International Supply Chains (“ABA
Report”) provides model contract clauses (“MCCs”) for U.S. buyer
companies (“Buyers”) (e.g., The Gap, Hershey’s, Wal-Mart) to include
in agreements with their suppliers (“Suppliers”).1 The objective of the
MCCs is to bolster human and worker rights across the supply chain,
reduce the incidence of human rights violations within the supply
chain, and enhance the legal protections for Buyers in the event that
their Suppliers engage in human rights violations. The ABA’s Business
Law Section identified international supply agreements as promising
vehicles for achieving this multi-faceted objective and embarked on the
MCC initiative to make these contracts work better and harder for
human rights.2 This is a highly innovative and important effort within
the business and human rights arena, and, as such, it is deserving of
both critical attention and constructive support.

1. David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International
Supply Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093 (2018)
[hereinafter Model Contract Clauses].
2. See id. at 1094 (“The hope is that following the steps outlined in the ABA Model
Principles will help eradicate labor trafficking and child labor from supply chains . . . .”).

2019]

CONTRACTING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

1521

As currently drafted, a central shortcoming of the MCCs is that they
place all responsibility for human rights violations on Suppliers and
completely shield Buyers from liability, even in situations where the
latter contribute to creating the conditions for violations to occur. In
other words, the MCCs ignore the possibility, and frequent reality, that
Buyers contribute to the occurrence of human rights violations by
engaging in irresponsible purchasing practices (e.g., last minute
changes to order quantities, delivery schedules, or product
specifications) that create pressure on Suppliers to squeeze their
workers, sometimes to the point of violating their human rights. This
Article argues that the contractual obligation to comply with the
Buyer’s human rights policies should extend to both parties to the
supply agreement, namely, the Supplier and the Buyer. This would
serve two purposes. First, sharing contractual responsibility for human
rights compliance would encourage Buyers to cultivate more
communicative and collaborative relationships with their Suppliers,
which would improve the identification of human rights risks, the quality
of monitoring, the detection of violations, and the pursuit of better
remediation strategies when violations do occur. Second, it would create
meaningful incentives for Buyers to better police their supply chains,
which could reduce the circulation of rights-violating goods in the U.S.
marketplace, and, down the line, protect consumers from making
purchases that implicate them in human rights abuses.
In earlier work, I coined the term “identity harm” to refer to the
distress experienced by consumers who learn that a company they
purchased from has failed to honor the environmental, social, or other
“virtuous promises” made about its wares.3 Virtuous promises are
increasingly prevalent in today’s marketplace4 and, because they are
not adequately policed by government regulation, it is relatively easy
for companies to say that they are doing good, when in fact they are
not. This can expose consumers to “virtuous duperies,” a type of deceit
that makes consumers act against their values and generates identity

3. Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 865 (2018); Sarah
Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2019) (recognizing
green, eco-friendly, fair-trade, cruelty free, conflict free, Made In America, and Kosher
as types of virtuous promises).
4. Alison Moodie, Has Corporate Social Responsibility Become the Modern Gold Rush?,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2015, 10:20 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2015/oct/22/corporate-social-responsibility-dove-chipotle-patagonia (discussing
Starbucks’ “Shared Planet” slogan, Chipotle’s “Food With Integrity” commitment, and
Dove’s “Real Beauty” campaign, among others).
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harm.5 A major concern with the MCCs is that they operate to deresponsibilize Buyers for human rights violations contractually,
shielding even those who engage in irresponsible purchasing practices
from liability. Such contractual impunity could have the perverse
effect of increasing the prevalence of bad purchasing practices; and,
by extension, the incidence of human rights abuses; and, by further
extension, the occurrence of identity harm. To correct course, and
with a keen eye toward future versions of the MCCs, Buyers’
contractual obligations should be upgraded along with Suppliers’.
Part I of this Article proceeds by briefly describing the MCCs and the
important positive contributions that the ABA initiative is making to
the business and human rights field.6 Part II discusses the central
shortcoming of the clauses, namely that they do not adequately
account for the role of Buyers in creating the conditions for human
rights violations to occur.7 It further identifies certain human rights
risks that the MCCs may inadvertently create as a result of their
excessively Buyer-friendly approach. Part III offers preliminary
recommendations for making better use of supply contracts as vehicles
for protecting human rights.8 Specifically, it proposes adding
provisions to the MCCs that would activate the Buyer’s own
(contractual and institutional) commitments to the soundness of their
supply chains. It also recommends that the MCCs incorporate the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”)
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”) as a
floor for human rights-related norm making across the supply chain,
not a ceiling.9 Lastly, this Article briefly outlines a comparative fault
mechanism that would identify an irresponsible Buyer as a “cobreaching party” of the supply contract and reduce their damages in
proportion to their contribution to the human rights violation. This

5. Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 3, at 865–66.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,
princ. 15, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (Mar. 21, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/
documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf [hereinafter U.N.
Guiding Principles]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 31–34 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/480
04323.pdf [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES].
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mechanism would allocate responsibility for human rights violations
more fairly between the parties and seek to bring the remedies for breach
in line with the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines, which prioritize
remediation for victims over money damages to contract parties.10
I. THE POWER OF CONTRACT: INNOVATING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
The MCCs were developed by the ABA’s Business Law Section,
specifically its Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in
International Supply Contracts (the “Working Group”). The stated
objective for the initiative is twofold: “The mission of the Working
Group is to make available well considered clauses that protect workers
and that are sensitive to the legal and business risks that companies
face.”11 Thus, the MCCs are designed to protect workers’ human
rights, on the one hand, and to help companies mitigate their legal
exposure, on the other. The intended audience and ultimate users of
the MCCs are U.S. Buyers, companies that place orders with domestic
and international Suppliers (e.g., factories, farms). Importantly, the
MCCs are agnostic regarding the Buyer’s industry, meaning that the
clauses could be incorporated into any type of supply agreement,
whether dealing with apparel, agricultural products, electronics, or car
manufacturing. While this versatility is appealing in that any business
can adopt the MCCs and tailor them to their own needs, it is also
problematic because Supplier-Buyer bargaining dynamics are likely to
differ substantially depending on the industry and on the Buyer’s
leverage within its industry. Suppliers tend to be in a weaker
bargaining position in the garment and agricultural industries; by
contrast, Suppliers tend to be in a stronger position in industries that
require a higher degree of technical capacity, expertise, and greater
access to the Buyer’s intellectual property, such as the electronics and
automotive industries.12 As discussed below, however, bargaining power

10. “In order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, business
enterprises should have in place policies and processes appropriate to their size and
circumstances, including: . . . (c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse
human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute.” U.N. Guiding Principles,
supra note 9, princ. 15(c); OECD: “Enterprises should . . . provide for or co-operate
through legitimate processes in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts
where they identify that they have caused or contributed to these impacts.” OECD
GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 31.
11. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1094–95.
12. The Five Forces, HARV. BUS. SCH., https://www.isc.hbs.edu/strategy/businessstrategy/Pages/the-five-forces.aspx (last visited June 1, 2019) (exploring renowned
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dynamics can have serious implications for the protection of human
rights—this is what renders the MCCs’ industry agnosticism problematic.
A. How Do the MCCs Work?
Buyers interested in adopting any or all of the MCCs would begin by
adding their human rights policy, supplier code of conduct, or some
equivalent document that captures the company’s responsible supply
chain commitments as an appendix to their supply agreement(s). For
ease of reference, this human rights appendix is referred to
throughout the ABA Report and this Article as “Schedule P.” The
Report explains that the letter “P” was chosen to stand for “Principles”
or “Policies,” but the schedule can of course be renamed at will.13 By
incorporating the human rights policies into the supply agreement as
contract schedules, the obligations contained therein become a part
of the contract, and, as such, are binding and enforceable.14 From
here, the next task for the MCCs is to set out the terms for enforcing
and operationalizing Schedule P, contractually. Buyers can pick and
choose which MCCs to include in their supply agreements and can
adapt any clauses they decide to include. For purposes of explaining
how the MCCs operate, however, this section assumes that all of the
clauses make it into the contract. The two examples below should help
to illustrate how the MCCs work.
As a first example, the MCCs include compliance with Schedule P in
the supply agreement’s section on representations and warranties,
which is titled, “Representations, Warranties, and Covenants on
Abusive Labor Practices.”15 MCC 1.1 treats each shipment by the
Supplier, on its own (i.e., without a separate certification of
compliance), as a representation of compliance with Schedule P.16
This example illustrates the importance of Schedule P and also the
economist Michael Porter’s “Five Forces” theory for evaluating strategic competitiveness
within industries); see also infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text; BUYING YOUR WAY
INTO TROUBLE? THE CHALLENGE OF RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT, INSIGHT
INVESTMENT 16–18, 23 (2004), http://etiskhandel.no/Artikler/1430 [hereinafter
BUYING YOUR WAY INTO TROUBLE] (“Almost all supply chains seem to be under continual
pressure to produce goods faster . . . . This tendency is particularly pronounced in
manufacturing and retailing apparel, footwear, home-ware and gifts, and in other sectors
that produce for markets driven by rapidly changing consumer trends.”).
13. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1096 n.13.
14. See id. at 1096 (explaining the intent to make human rights clauses binding by
inserting them into supply contracts as appendices).
15. Id. ¶ 1.
16. Id. ¶ 1.1.
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MCCs’ agnosticism as to the Schedule’s content. For MCC 1.1 to have
any human rights value, Schedule P must be fairly robust; if the Buyer’s
human rights policy (i.e., Schedule P) is weak, then any representations
made under MCC 1.1 will be relatively shallow. Put another way, the
human rights protections afforded by the representation of compliance
are only as expansive or limited as the Buyer’s human rights policy. In
spite of this, the Working Group takes no position on the content of
Schedule P, explaining that the latter is for the company to define.17
As a second example, still in the representations and warranties section,
MCC 1.2 requires that the Supplier ensure that any entity, be it the
Supplier, its representatives, or any of its representatives’ representatives
acting in connection with the contract, “do so . . . only on the basis of
legally binding and enforceable written contracts that impose on and
secure from the Representative terms [in compliance with] [equivalent to
those imposed by] [at least as protective as those imposed by] Schedule
P.”18 This MCC operates in two ways. First, it forbids informal
subcontracting by the Supplier. Informal subcontracting has been
identified as a major source of human rights risk; when production moves
out of the line of sight of the original Buyer-Supplier contract and into
the shadows of subcontracting, it becomes much harder to know, let alone
regulate, how workers are being treated.19 Second, MCC 1.2 requires that
any supplier subcontracted by the original Supplier also comply with
Schedule P (or an equivalent set of human rights standards). Thus, the
MCCs work by setting out specific rules of their own (e.g., prohibition
against subcontracting) and incorporating the rules and standards
contained in Schedule P into the contract via the representations and
warranties.
MCC 1.2 also highlights the MCCs’ modularity feature: Buyers can
choose any one of the formulations included in the brackets or indeed
come up with a formulation of their own. This modularity gives Buyers
flexibility to select whatever wording is best suited to their needs. It

17. See id. at 1096 (“The content of Schedule P will likely vary significantly by
industry and is beyond the scope of this Working Group.”).
18. Id. ¶ 1.2.
19. Vijay Padmanabhan et al., The Hidden Price of Low Cost: Subcontracting in Bangladesh’s
Garment Industry (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2659202
(“While the lead contractors with direct relationships with Western companies are subject
to the code and audit system, companies further down the subcontracting often are
invisible to Western brands.”). This lack of oversight makes the subcontractor susceptible
to human rights violations including low pay, forced overtime, child labor, and failure to
meet “the bare minimum of Western safety requirements.” Id.
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also gives Buyers a sense for the negotiation options available to them.
For instance, a stricter Buyer could choose to make its human rights
policy (Schedule P) applicable to all subcontracts and subcontractors.
Conversely, a less strict Buyer might give the Supplier more leeway by
allowing them to include their own human rights policy in their
subcontract, so long as that policy is equivalent to, or at least as
protective as the Buyer’s policy.
Other MCCs will be discussed below, but for present purposes,
consider some of the key takeaways from this brief overview. First, the
MCCs’ agnosticism both to industry and to the content of Schedule P.
Second, the MCCs’ two-pronged approach, which consists of offsetting
out their own contractual obligations (in the text of the MCCs) and
incorporating the pre-contractual obligations contained in the Buyer’s
human rights policy (Schedule P) into the supply agreement. Finally, the
MCCs’ modularity feature, which is useful for negotiation purposes, but
also for signaling to the Buyer where the more serious human rights risks
and liabilities lie. With this background, we can now turn to assessing the
MCCs’ potential for protecting human rights in the supply chain.
B. What the MCCs Do Well
This section discusses two major contributions that the MCC project
makes to the business and human rights space. Specifically, the project
innovatively uses contract as a technology for making soft policies hard.
It also supplies MCC adopters with a new framework for understanding
product conformity. This new framework accounts not only a
product’s conformity with technical expectations, such as quantity and
design, but also conformity with expectations about how the product
was made, and specifically, how workers were treated throughout the
production process. In this way, the ABA project is helping to erode
an outdated and problematic distinction between conformity of
product and conformity of process.
1.

Making soft policies hard
A first hugely important and positive contribution that the MCCs
make to the business and human rights space is that they operate to
make soft policy commitments hard by incorporating Buyers’ human
rights policies into the contract as Schedule P. The effect of this simple
but powerful move is to render binding and enforceable the content
of a company’s supply chain commitments. The MCCs transplant
whatever commitments companies make about human rights and labor
rights from their corporate policies “[into] the actual contract documents
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where those policies may have greater impact.”20 “Contractualizing”
Buyers’ human rights policies in this way is a foundational strategy of the
MCCs, and it stems from the recognition that company policies, on their
own, can be quite airy as commitment devices.21
In previous work, I have described the social and environmental
policy commitments that companies market to consumers as
generating loud “sustainability noise.”22 Companies often surround
sound themselves in talk of sustainability without actually walking the
walk of sustainability; a danger of sustainability noise is that it can lull
consumers into believing that a company is doing good in the world,
when the reality may be quite different.23 This is problematic because
sustainability noise is, for the most part, not actionable. If a promise
contained in “side communications” to consumers, meaning
communications that are made off-label and not through direct
advertising, turns out to be empty or false, consumers generally have
very little legal recourse—under either tort, contract, or state
consumer law.24 Thus, the sustainability promises that a company
makes about its treatment of workers, the planet, and animals in side
communications (e.g., in corporate social responsibility reports, news
articles or press releases, supplier codes of conduct, company websites,
or by virtue of subscribing to a voluntary initiative such as the UNGPs)
are generally viewed as being non-actionable, even though these
promises matter to consumers.25 Rather than being treated as

20. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1094.
21. Id. (“Adoption of policies at the corporate level, while a good start, is not always
enough: principles need to be put into practice.”).
22. Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 3, at 880–81; Dadush, The Law of Identity
Harm, supra note 3, at 833–36.
23. Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 3, at 834–36.
24. Id. at 835–39 (describing case law wherein corporate statements on social
policy were not deemed a type of enforceable warranty, unless, as explained in one
case, the statement was sufficiently specific).
25. See, e.g., Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1079–80 (N.D.
Cal. 2017), aff’d, 731 F. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims that
defendant used its corporate social responsibility reports, supplier codes of conduct,
and website disclosures to deceive consumers into buying products they otherwise
would not have under the belief that no slave labor was used to harvest the product);
Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 654–56 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x
460 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s allegations that Hershey violated California’s
False Advertising Law for failure to disclose the use of forced child labor in the
chocolate supply chain despite misleading assertions on Hershey’s website regarding
its commitment to eradicate labor and human rights violations); Wirth v. Mars Inc.,
No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234, at *1–3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016),
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enforceable promises or as statements of fact, the commitments
contained in side communications are generally treated only as
aspirational expressions of a company’s vision, of what it wants to
achieve, not what it actually is achieving.26
In case law, the only meaningful exception to the general nonactionability of sustainability noise “rule” is National Consumers League
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.27 There, the court denied in part and granted
in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss where the National
Consumers League alleged that the defendants had violated the D.C.
Consumer Protection Procedures Act by not enforcing “their own
Corporate Statements in dealing with suppliers, thereby violating their
promises to the general public.”28 Each company had made statements
on its website expressing an expectation that: (1) its suppliers comply
aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing plaintiffs’ allegations that Mars
violated California UDAP statutes when Mars did not disclose that its pet food could
contain seafood fished by slave labor in Thailand); Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp.
3d 1016, 1019–20 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 891 F. App’x 857 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing
plaintiff’s suit alleging the use of forced child labor in chocolate production because
the company did not have a duty to disclose tainted supply chains); McCoy v. Nestle
USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956–57 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 462 (9th
Cir. 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims alleging that statements in corporate social
responsibility reports, codes of conduct, and website assurances were misleading
regarding the use of forced child labor in chocolate production); Barber v. Nestlé
USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956–57 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 464 (9th
Cir. 2018) (dismissing plaintiffs’ False Advertising Law claims alleging that Nestlé had
duty to disclose the use of forced labor in its Fancy Feast cat food supply chain); Hall
v. Sea World Entm’t, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-660-CAB-RBB, 2015 WL 9659911, at *1 (S.D.
Cal. Dec. 23, 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim based on the allegation that had they
known the omitted information concerning the health and living conditions of whales
at Sea World, they would not have purchased tickets to enter the park); Ruiz v.
Darigold, Inc., No. C14-1283RSL, 2014 WL 5599989, at *1–3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2014)
(dismissing consumer plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants used their corporate
social responsibility report to mislead consumers into thinking company’s dairies
treated their workers and cows well); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247–48 (Cal.
2002) (reversing a lower court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ suit against Nike on behalf of
California citizens for misrepresenting its labor practices when they said they were free
from human and labor rights violations and made misleading statements to this effect
in documents, including press releases and letters to newspapers, university presidents,
and athletic directors) [together, the “Identity Harm Cases”].
26. Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 3, at 835–36.
27. No. 2015-CA-007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016)
(explaining that because the defendants had sourced supplies from Rana Plaza, a
factory in Bangladesh that collapsed in 2013 killing over 1000 workers, including
children, plaintiffs could rely on the collapse to support the inference that defendants
had failed to honor their corporate social responsibility promises).
28. Id. at *1.
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with applicable laws and regulations; (2) its suppliers provide a safe
and healthy working environment, free of child labor; and (3) a
commitment to audit supplier compliance with its (buyer-company)
standards.29 The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for
statements falling under (1) and (2) because they “are generally
aspirational in nature” and, as such, cannot be “recast . . . into
promises.”30 However, with respect to statements under (3), the court
denied the motion, saying that those statements are “more specific and
contain verifiable facts that may be material to a consumer’s purchasing
decisions.”31 In other words, because the auditing statements were
specific and verifiable, they were sufficient for purposes of stating an
actionable claim under D.C. consumer law. The court did not reach the
merits of the allegations and the case eventually settled, but the
recognition that corporate social responsibility commitments contained
in websites can be actionable is a big precedential step in the right
direction for aggrieved consumers.32 As Ramona Lampley correctly
highlights, this case is also a big precedential step in the wrong direction
for transnational corporations concerned about their exposure to liability
for human rights violations; going forward, companies are likely to strip
their sustainability commitments of any verifiable statements of fact.33
Even with National Consumers League on the books, however, the vast
majority of virtuous promises will continue to be treated as aspirational
and not enforceable. This state of legal affairs is problematic because it
creates too much room for noisy sustainability promises to proliferate,
with no accountability if they turn out to be vacuous or exploitative of
consumers’ virtuous expectations. The challenge is therefore to cast a
wider net over companies’ virtuous promises so that more sustainabilityrelated claims, including those made in side communications, can be
treated as actionable. The more these promises are taken seriously, the
more likely it is that the companies making them will honor them. This
would create a virtuous circle wherein the circulation of tainted goods
in the U.S. marketplace would diminish, and consumers would be able
to consume with greater confidence that they are not (inadvertently)
supporting human rights abuses with their purchases.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *7.
32. Statement on Resolution of Lawsuit Against Walmart, JC Penney, and The Children’s
Place, NAT’L CONSUMERS LEAGUE, https://www.nclnet.org/resolution_walmart (last
visited June 1, 2019).
33. Ramona Lampley, Mitigating Risk, Eradicating Slavery, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1707, 1747 (2019).
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This context should help to frame the “bigness” of the MCCs’
contribution to the business and human rights space. By including
company human rights policies as an appendix to the supply contract,
and making the commitments contained in the policy contractually
enforceable, the MCCs go a long way toward addressing the
actionability challenge.34 However, the MCCs do not go far enough
because they only make the commitments contained in Schedule P
actionable against the Supplier, not the Buyer. As currently drafted,
the MCCs make the Supplier the only party capable of breaching
Schedule P, and so, the supply agreement, because of a human rights
violation. Furthermore, as concerns the prospects for consumers to
bring claims against Buyers with dirty (or not as clean as promised)
supply chains, the MCCs leave Buyers’ liability exposure largely intact.
Aggrieved consumers are no better off bringing claims against an
MCC-adopting Buyer than against a company with only a standalone
human rights policy on its corporate governance books. In fact, MCC
5.7 includes a disclaimer that “[t]here are no third-party beneficiaries
to this Agreement.”35 Presumably, this clause is intended to preclude
consumers, as well as Supplier employees, from bringing a claim
against the Buyer for a breach of Schedule P.
While this Article is critical of the MCCs in some respects, no amount
of criticism should downplay the importance of putting policy into
action contractually, as they propose to do. This is a major
contribution to the business and human rights space, especially given
that this area is generally under-regulated by governments.36 The
Working Group’s strategy of hardening otherwise soft human rights
policies via contract is a powerful demonstration of how private
ordering can be put to the service of human rights.
2.

Relaxing the product/process distinction
A second valuable contribution of the MCC project is that it begins
to tear away at the distinction between product and process, a
distinction that permeates U.S. contract, sales, and products liability
law. While U.S. law is relatively well-equipped to deal with the quality
or safety of a product, it is much less adept at regulating the process by

34. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
35. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, ¶ 5.7.
36. See David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: Achievements and
Limitations, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68, 73 (2010) (explaining that private, civil regulation
“proposes to fill the regulatory gap” between global markets and government regulation).
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which a product comes into being. Indeed, there is a large and
stubborn gap in U.S. commercial law between product and process
regulation, or between product regulation and producer protection, with the
latter receiving almost no attention.37 The ABA Report identifies this
regulatory gap at the outset: “Sales law and contract law are keyed to
production of conforming goods, like well-stitched soccer balls[, but]
the background law does not deal easily with the problem of soccer
balls that are perfectly stitched but that were sewn by child slaves.”38 The
MCCs step into this gap with an explicit intention to address process.
The MCCs begin to bridge the product-process divide by treating process
obligations as being on par with product specifications. This is achieved by
adding Schedule P as an appendix to the supply agreement alongside other
appendices that deal with more technical product-specific matters (e.g.,
design, cotton content, rotation speeds, etc.). Human rights commitments
thus “appear in an appendix to the agreement, Schedule P, just as the
buyer’s specifications for goods themselves are likely to appear in an
appendix” and become binding as a result, with the MCCs providing
“enforceable remedies for their violation.”39
MCC 3.1 illustrates how a violation of Schedule P, a process-focused
appendix, would constitute a breach of the supply agreement, just like
a violation of a more product-specific appendix. This MCC allows a
Buyer to “revoke its acceptance, in whole or in part, upon . . . Buyer’s
discovery of Supplier’s noncompliance with Schedule P, which the
parties have agreed in Section 2 above is a nonconformity that
substantially impairs the value of the Goods and this Agreement to Buyer.”40
Here again, the Working Group is employing the legal technology of
contract in a highly innovative fashion, this time to transform an
otherwise unenforceable process commitment into a contractual
binding obligation. This elegantly simple move has a couple of
important legal effects. First, as just explained, it places product and
process obligations on the same enforceability plane, making both
equally binding. The second, and perhaps even more profound legal
effect of making process commitments enforceable, is that it creates an
opening for a fundamental rethinking of “conformity.” Under U.S.
contract law, product conformity generally refers only to conformity
37. “Producer” refers here to the people who work in supply chains and whose human
rights are at risk. The planet is also a producer whose health is jeopardized when supply
chains are poorly managed, but for present purposes, the focus is on human producers.
38. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1095 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 1096.
40. Id. at 1100 (emphasis added).
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with the Buyer’s technical product specifications.41 But the MCCs add
a process dimension to conformity, a human rights and worker
protection dimension. This move has the potential to revamp
common understandings of conformity altogether.
The call for expanding conformity to include process, as well as
product, is not new. Professor Douglas Kysar compellingly advocated
for such an expansion over a decade ago.42 However, the idea of
employing a contractual solution for operationalizing more inclusive
notions of conformity is new. The idea is valuable in part because it
could help to fill a protective gap in U.S. consumer law wherein
companies are not required to disclose process-information or human
rights problems in their supply chains. Yet non-disclosure can hurt
consumers by making them unwittingly complicit in supporting tainted
supply chains and so in hurting others, albeit indirectly.
In a recent string of cases that can be collected under the umbrella,
“identity harm cases,” consumer plaintiffs argued that they would not
have bought what turned out to be, for example, “slave chocolate,”
“slave pet food,” and “slave shrimp,” had they known the truth about
these items’ process-history prior to purchase.43 Although the plaintiffs
in these cases were able to establish standing, they ultimately failed to
make out their consumer law claims because the courts found no duty
41. Pursuant to the perfect tender rule, a buyer may reject goods “if the goods or
the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract.” U.C.C. § 2-601
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). “Thus a buyer may cancel a single-delivery
contract for any nonconformity, including those respecting quality, quantity, title, and
the timeliness of delivery.” JEFFREY D. WITTENBERG, COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING: SALES
UNDER THE UCC § 5.01 (2009).
42. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526–640 (2004) (examining
the conceptual distinction between product-related information [e.g., whether a
consumer good is unsafe for the user] and process-related information [e.g., whether a
good’s production harmed workers, animals, or the environment] that appears in much
of domestic and international law). Professor Kysar ultimately found that the “distinction
proves far too thin and formalistic of a conceptual device,” in particular “once one
examines the full panoply of reasons why consumers might express preferences for
processes.” Id. at 526. Professor Kysar argues for expanding the integration of the global
regulatory system by accommodating consumers’ preferences for less dangerous
processes, particularly since process preferences may come to “serve as indispensable
outlets for public-regarding behavior.” Id. I have echoed Prof. Kyzar’s arguments in my
own work, Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 3, at 821–29 (arguing that the
dangers of a good’s production history are material to consumers and that products
liability law should adopt a more expansive definition of product defect to include
defective, human, or environmental harm-generating processes).
43. See supra note 25 (summarizing the Identity Harm Cases).
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for the defendant companies to disclose process-information or
anything pertaining to the “dangerosity” of the production process.44
The duty to disclose applies only to those aspects of the product that
make it dangerous for the consumer to use, not dangerous for
producers to make.45 To date, then, the identity harm cases have only
entrenched the product/process divide. This outcome is deeply
troubling given that process-information clearly matters to consumers;
if it did not matter, these cases would not have been brought in the
first place. And because companies are not required to disclose
process-information, consumers must choose between blindly
purchasing goods that may turn out to have horrible—identity
harming—process histories, and doing their own due diligence, which
is a significant undertaking, especially for small ticket items like
chocolate. That is not a fair choice. The under-protectiveness of U.S.
consumer law could be corrected by expanding disclosure rules to
require more process-information. More disclosure, which could take
the visually digestible form of certifications, would allow consumers to
make values-aligned purchasing choices and to better protect
themselves from identity harm.
Now, the MCCs do not speak to enhancing process-information
disclosures to consumers—this is not in their mandate and making it
so would likely jeopardize the success of this important and already
groundbreaking initiative. But, by bringing process conformity on par
with product conformity, the MCCs get at the problem another way: if
the supply contracts that bring goods to the U.S. consumer shelves
regulate process as well as product, that could help to cleanse the
marketplace of rights-violating goods at the outset. Additionally, if the
MCCs come to be widely adopted, that could influence trade usage in
terms of how conformity is defined, interpreted, and enforced.46 Down
the line, the MCCs could also help generate debate about mandatory
process-information disclosure. Going even further, upgraded process
standards could become incorporated into the implied warranty of
merchantability47 (again through usage), which would create another,
44. Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 3, at 841–46; see, e.g., Dana v.
Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 664 (N.D. Ca. 2016) (“[T]he weight of authority
limits a duty to disclose under the CLRA to issues of product safety, unless disclosure
is necessary to counter an affirmative misrepresentation.”).
45. Dadush, The Law of Identity Harm, supra note 3, at 841–46.
46. For an illuminating discussion of the limited value of usage in contract disputes,
see Lisa Bernstein, The Myth of Trade Usages: A Talk, 23 BARRY L. REV. 119 (2018).
47. U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
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perhaps more viable, avenue for consumers to bring claims against
companies with tainted supply chains.
II. WHAT THE MCCS DO POORLY: OFFLOADING
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS ONTO SUPPLIERS
Part I of this Article highlighted two major contributions of the ABA
initiative to the business and human rights space, that it makes
innovative use of contract as technology in order to harden soft
policies and erodes the outdated and problematic distinction between
process and product. This Part addresses a central shortcoming of the
initiative, which is that the MCCs go too far in terms of protecting
Buyers from the risk of human rights violations in their supply chains,
and conversely, that they put too much of the accountability burden
for non-compliance on Suppliers. Under-responsibilizing Buyers and
over-responsibilizing Suppliers means that the MCC project changes
only one piece of the human rights violating machinery, the Supplier
side, without changing the other really important piece, the Buyer side.
This lopsidedness undermines not only the integrity of the MCC
project, but also its potential for reducing human rights violations in
global supply chains.
A. Entrenching Dangerous Dynamics
To begin, it is important to get a sense for the Buyer-Supplier
dynamics that are at work within global supply chains. The ABA
Report’s introduction states, “[w]e cannot stand by when children are
trafficked and traded or when workers die in factory collapses and
fires.”48 This suggests the MCCs are particularly concerned with
Suppliers such as the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh, which
collapsed in 2013 leaving over a thousand workers—mostly women and
also some children—dead in its wake,49 or the Tazreen Fashions
factory, where an electrical fire led to the deaths of over one hundred
workers who, because of blocked fire exits, could not make their way
out of the building in time.50 The MCCs’ preoccupation with forced
adult and child labor would extend to Suppliers working in the
agriculture and fishing industries, where human rights abuses are
48. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1094.
49. Padmanabhan et al., supra note 19.
50. Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Bangladesh Finds Gross Negligence in Factory Fire,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/world/asia/ban
gladesh-factory-fire-caused-by-gross-negligence.html.
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frequent, and also to the electronics industries, where Suppliers
notoriously overwork their employees, sometimes to the point of
suicide.51 Generally, Suppliers working in industries where labor and
human rights violations are an issue tend to be based in developing
countries with weak labor laws, weak enforcement of international
human rights norms, including norms pertaining to the protection of
workers’ freedom of association, and weak rule of law.52 Such
Suppliers often face serious operational challenges, including systemic
corruption (e.g., factory inspectors and building license issuers expect
bribes), civil unrest, and inadequate infrastructure (e.g., access to
electricity and to reliable transportation networks)—all forces that
increase the costs of production.53
The Suppliers that are of concern to the MCC project are likely to
be financially, technologically, and administratively under-resourced.
As such, they are likely to be vulnerable to fluctuations in market
demand and in a weak bargaining position relative to Western Buyers.
However, not all Suppliers are created equal. Suppliers engaged in
high-value or specialized production, such as in the automotive or
electronics industry, may have greater bargaining power vis-à-vis Buyers
than less specialized Suppliers in the garment (especially fast fashion),
agriculture, or fishing industries. In specialized industries, Buyers are
more likely to invest in their Suppliers (e.g., training, capital
51. TULANE UNIV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH & TROPICAL MED., 2013/14 SURVEY RESEARCH
81 (2015) (“In the aggregate
more than 2 million children between 5–17 years are estimated to be in hazardous work
in cocoa in 2013/14.”); Brian Merchant, Life and Death in Apple’s Forbidden City, GUARDIAN
(June 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/18/foxconnlife-death-forbidden-city-longhua-suicide-apple-iphone-brian-merchant-one-device-extra
ct; Alexandra Wexler, Chocolate Makers Fight a Melting Supply of Cocoa, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13,
2016, 9:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chocolate-makers-fight-a-melting-supplyof-cocoa-1452738616 (hazardous conditions include using dangerous instruments like
machetes, “clearing land, carrying heavy loads, or [working] for long hours, at night or
with exposure to agrochemicals”).
52. Padmanabhan et al., supra note 19 (explaining that in Bangladesh, which is the
second largest exporter of garments behind China, workers often do not receive a living
wage, are forced to work overtime, and child labor is rampant, with many factories not
meeting the bare minimum of Western safety requirements, and that, because cheap labor
is a major selling point, labor laws tend to be lax, not up to international standards, and
poorly enforced due both to a lack of political will and a lack of capacity).
53. Id. (describing conditions in Bangladesh specifically, though the realities depicted
in that context are common in other developing countries, as well). The ETI Report
explains that “an estimated 60 m[illion] workers (largely women) are employed by the
garment industry alone. While not all of these form part of global supply chains they form
the context for conditions for many.” ETI Report, infra note 59, at 1.
ON CHILD LABOR IN WEST AFRICAN COCOA GROWING AREAS
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improvements, technology upgrades, sharing intellectual property).
Once a Buyer has invested in a particular Supplier, its “switching costs”
increase, meaning that changing Suppliers becomes a more costly
proposition.54 The higher the switching costs, the more leverage the
Supplier has to negotiate better deals with the Buyer.55 But in less
specialized industries where switching costs are lower, such as garment
manufacturing and agriculture—industries that employ many of the
world’s poor—Buyers can more easily “factory shop” and swap
Suppliers out and in.56 This diminishes Suppliers’ bargaining power
and creates pressure on them to engage in a race to the bottom, both
in terms of offering competitive (often below production cost) prices
and in terms of under-protecting workers’ human rights.57 Indeed, a
major reason why Suppliers engage in problematic human rights
behavior is to keep their production costs low, so that they can keep
their prices low, so that they can improve their chances of getting and
keeping contracts with foreign Buyers.58
The point is that we should not assume that all Suppliers are weak
and all Buyers are strong, or conversely, that all Suppliers are strong
and all Buyers are weak.59 Yet, the MCCs appear to operate on exactly
54. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, A Bargaining Dynamic Transaction Cost Approach to
Understanding Framework Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1621, 1660 (2019).
55. But see Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV.
747, 765 (2014) (explaining that not even the high-value players are invulnerable to
the risk of substitution).
56. ETI Report, infra note 59, at 6 (stating that “responsible purchasing is integral
to building supply chain resilience and improving lives. It can have a significant impact
on workers: nearly two thirds of the world’s poor make a living from agriculture and
an estimated 60 m[illion] workers are employed in the global garment industry, most
of whom are women”).
57. Id. (“The opportunity to sell to international buyers helps to lift people out of
poverty. However, conventional purchasing practices can undermine relationships
with suppliers and produce negative consequences for workers. For example, intense
competition for customers’ business can push suppliers to engage in a ‘race to the
bottom’ on price.”). Indeed, “39% of suppliers responding to our survey said they
accepted orders below the cost of production in 2015, 29% of whom then struggled to
pay workers.” Id.
58. In actuality, many factors affect a Buyer’s leverage over its Supplier. For instance,
how much the Buyer actually purchases from its Supplier matters for determining who
has the most bargaining chips. A Buyer that purchases only a small share of a Supplier’s
product will have less say over the latter’s human rights behavior than a larger Buyer.
Moreover, Buyers themselves often act as Suppliers for other Buyers. Thus, a Buyer’s
leverage position can differ substantially within a single supply chain.
59. Katharine Early, The Joint Ethical Trading Initiatives’ Guide to Buying Responsibly,
ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE 33 (Katrine Karlsen et al. eds., 2017), https://www
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this last assumption, that Buyers are weak and Suppliers are strong. As
a result, the MCCs work to bolster Buyers’ rights under the supply
contract in order to increase their leverage over Suppliers. This bias
highlights the central shortcoming of the MCCs: they overlook the
reality that Buyers often hold many (if not all) of the bargaining chips
in supply agreement negotiations and that their Buyers’ contractual
behavior accounts for a large part of the human rights in global supply
chains story. As explained more fully below, in certain situations, the
MCC approach of bolstering Buyers’ contractual rights and restricting
Suppliers’ rights is not only unjustified, it is also dangerous.
To illustrate the problem, consider the case study prepared by the
New York University (NYU) Center for Business and Human Rights.60
The study (reproduced here with minor variations) focuses on the fast
fashion industry in Bangladesh, but similar studies could focus on
contract farming or contract fishing arrangements, for example. The
case study introduces readers to a Buyer called Basic Black that has a
supply agreement with a garment factory in Bangladesh called Raz.
The relationship between Basic Black and Raz is “on demand,”
meaning that Basic Black notifies Raz of the quantity, specifications,
price per unit, and expected delivery times of orders at its
convenience. The agreement indicates that when presented with an
order from Basic Black, Raz has only two choices: accept or reject. Raz
has no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the order, and any
attempt to negotiate or modify the order will be treated as a rejection.
The agreement contains a human rights-oriented provision (similar to
MCC 1.2, quoted above) that forbids Raz from subcontracting
production under the order without first obtaining written consent
from Basic Black. For several years, Basic Black and Raz have a good
relationship, with a steady and consistent stream of orders from Basic
Black and a reliable supply of quality products by Raz. One day, Basic
Black makes a big splash with the launch of the world’s most perfect Tshirt and, to take advantage of the additional demand, it decides to triple
its order from Raz, without extending the production timeline and
without increasing the per unit price that could be used to pay overtime
wages to factory workers. Raz accepts and fills the order, and months

.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/shared_resources/guide_to_buying_responsibly
.pdf [hereinafter ETI Report].
60. Padmanabhan et al., supra note 19.
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later, Basic Black discovers that Raz had subcontracted a portion of the
production to another factory, thus violating the supply agreement.61
The case study leaves readers with the questions, how should Basic
Black respond to the violation of the agreement by Raz? Should they
cancel the contract and sue Raz for breach? Should they drop Raz as
a Supplier and find another factory to work with? Or should they seek
to understand what went wrong and attempt to remediate the issue?
Building on the last question, are there ways in which Basic Black is
responsible for the decision by Raz to resort to unauthorized
subcontracting? And could the supply agreement, or Basic Black’s
ordering practices, be modified to reduce the pressures on Raz to
“cheat” by subcontracting? These are all important questions, but the
last are of particular interest because they draw attention to the reality
that a Buyer’s (bad) conduct can explain, and even be a catalyst for,
Supplier behaviors that put human rights at risk.
To clarify, “Buyer conduct” does not refer to Buyer monitoring or
auditing of their Suppliers; monitoring and auditing tend to be
expensive, difficult to implement, and often not terribly effective as
compliance tools.62 Rather, Buyer conduct refers to something much
more basic and simple, namely, how Buyers actually engage with their
Suppliers on day-to-day, human-to-human basis, contractually and extracontractually. It refers to, for instance, how the Buyer negotiates with
the Supplier; how much room the Buyer gives the Supplier to say, “no,
we can’t meet your requirements on this timeline, but we could on a
longer timeline or with a higher per unit price;” how much production
lead time a Buyer gives its Supplier, especially when making changes to
an existing order; how often a Buyer makes changes to its orders, in terms
of quantity or product specifications (e.g., design specs); but also, whether
the Buyer rewards “good” suppliers (meaning those that perform well
with respect to product and process) with longer term contracts.
The NYU case study and various reports published by nongovernmental organizations such as the Ethical Trading Initiative

61. Id.
62. See Parella, supra note 55, at 787–88. Note too that the MCCs include several
provisions that disclaim the Buyer’s obligation to monitor or inspect their Suppliers.
See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, ¶ 5.7 (“(a) Buyer does not assume a duty to
monitor Supplier or its Representatives, including, without limitation, for compliance
with laws or standards regarding working conditions, pay, hours, discrimination,
forced labor, child labor, or the like; (b) Buyer does not assume a duty to monitor or
inspect the safety of any workplace of Supplier or its Representatives nor to monitor
any labor practices of Supplier or its Representatives . . . .”).
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(“ETI”) and international organizations such as the International Labor
Organization, persuasively argue that one of the root causes of human
rights violations is the Buyer’s purchasing practices.63 This means that
even the most innovative efforts to root out human rights violations
along the supply chain and to clean up the consumer marketplace will
be far less effective for focusing only on Suppliers, rather than on both
contract parties, Suppliers and Buyers. Based on a survey with 1500
Suppliers about their experiences dealing with Western buyers, the ETI
finds that conventional—not exceptional—purchasing practices
include:64 aggressive price negotiation; inaccurate product specifications
and forecasting of production needs; late orders, short lead times, and last
minute changes to orders; lack of support to meet ethical standards,
including no reward for good performance;65 and siloing of Buyer
purchasing teams and ethical trading or corporate social responsibility
teams, leading to Suppliers receiving conflicting direction.66
These practices, the ETI explains, “put suppliers under intense
pressure” to produce quickly and cheaply, which “lead[s] directly to
poor working conditions and low pay for workers.”67 The impact on
workers can run a wide range, including “[s]uppressed wages, [p]oor
health and safety measures, [i]rregular working hours and excessive
overtime, [u]nrealistic performance targets, [l]ack of breaks, [l]ack of
63. ETI Report, supra note 59, at 4–5; Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead & Luis Pinedo Caro,
International Labour Office, Purchasing Practices And Working Conditions In Global
Supply Chains: Global Survey Results, Inwork Issue Brief No. 10, 11 (2017); Padmanabhan
et al., supra note 19; BUYING YOUR WAY INTO TROUBLE, supra note 12, at 33–34.
64. ETI Report, supra note 59, at 5.
65. Recent (unpublished) research by Greg Distelhorst suggests that suppliers who
do well on human rights protection may actually price themselves out of contracts with
Western buyers, meaning that suppliers could be punished for protecting human
rights (at a higher production cost that is passed on to buyers) by losing their contracts.
In other words, both compliance and non-compliance increase the substitution risks
for suppliers. Furthermore, the ETI has found that the suppliers who receive repeat
orders from Western buyers receive new contracts on the basis of their price-point, not
their human rights protection record. Telephone Interview with Casey O’Connor
Willis, Sani Fellow, Research and Adjunct Professor, NYU Stern Center for Business
and Human Rights (Jan. 22, 2019); see also Telephone Interview with Peter McAllister,
Executive Director, Ethical Trading Initiative (Jan. 18, 2019).
66. ETI Report, supra note 59, at 5, 7 (“While many companies require suppliers to
respect their codes of conduct (CoC) and monitor suppliers’ labour rights
performance, their buying practices often sit at odds with these initiatives. As a buyer,
you may have been trained to negotiate on margin, delivery times and product quality,
rather than ethical criteria. Similarly, you are not typically incentivized to make
ordering decisions based on respect for human rights.”).
67. ETI Report, supra note 59, at 4.
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regular or permanent work, [and] [h]arassment and abuse from
management.”68 In sum, the more a Buyer squeezes its Supplier, the
more the Supplier will squeeze its own and other factories’ workers,
which can lead to human rights abuses.
In part because of their already vulnerable position, on-demand
Suppliers that survive on an order-to-order basis may find it difficult
not to cheat by subcontracting production to other factories (or farms,
or whatever the production unit may be). Subcontracting—especially
non-transparent, unsupervised subcontracting—can have negative
implications for human rights by pushing production into the shadows
and impairing the Buyer’s visibility into its supply chain. But the NYU
case study highlights that subcontracting can also be a simple economic
decision. That is, the decision to subcontract may be driven less by lack
of concern for human rights than by the need to achieve efficiency gains
against a backdrop of inadequate capacity and intense competition69:
Subcontracting does not inherently increase human rights risks and
can be a good way to increase efficiency and lower costs, when done
with transparency and oversight. But the human rights risks
associated with production outside the audit system, and the
resulting business risks, has led many Western brands to formally
ban subcontracting without the brand’s approval in their supplier
agreements. The efficiency gains from subcontracting for lead
manufacturers often outweigh the risks of being detected and the
practice persists throughout the [garment] industry. Officially
banning non-transparent subcontracting has at this point merely resulted in
a hidden production system that is removed from any form of oversight.70

This quote highlights that banning subcontracting outright, as Buyers
are increasingly wont to do, can actually push subcontracting deeper
underground where workers’ human rights are at even greater risk of
being violated. Why would a ban on subcontracting increase the risk
of human rights violations? In part because the more serious the
consequences for the Supplier of being caught, the greater the
incentive for them to conceal their breach by pushing production
deeper into the shadows. In this regard, the MCCs are highly
68. Id. at 5.
69. Padmanabhan et al., supra note 19 (explaining that reasons for subcontracting
include the need to spread manufacturing across several factories in order to mitigate the
risks of infrastructure limitations, such as transportation delays, electrical blackouts, and
civil unrest, that can slow production to a halt). Otherwise put, subcontracting is sometimes
necessary in order to meet the tight deadlines imposed by Western buyers.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
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problematic because they make the consequences of being caught very
severe indeed. By attaching punishingly stiff penalties to Supplier
breaches of Schedule P, the MCCs may inadvertently increase the
incentives for Suppliers to hide their subcontracting practices—
practices that, again, are often pursued because of production
pressures coming from Buyers. Ironically, then, the MCCs could
generate an increase the occurrence of human rights abuses within the
supply chain. To see this, consider that the primary tool with which
the MCCs equip Buyers to deter Suppliers from cheating is a very large
stick—albeit one that Buyers might not be able to hit much with
because many Suppliers are under-resourced and judgment proof.
The stick is unmissable in MCCs 2.2 (Rejection), 2.3 ([Cancellation]
[Avoidance]),71 2.5 (No Right to Cure), and 5.6 (Indemnification).
MCC 2.2 states that if the Buyer “has reason to believe” that there is a
violation of Schedule P, “[it] shall have the right to reject any Goods
produced by or associated with Supplier . . . [r]egardless of whether the
rejected [g]oods were . . . produced . . . under this or other contracts.”72
In other words, under the vaguely worded “reason to believe” standard,
an aggrieved Buyer has the right to cancel the problematic supply
contract, but also any other contracts that the Buyer and the Supplier
may have together. One suspected breach could therefore operate to
destroy the entire contractual relationship, even if only one contract was
(maybe) problematic, and even if the relationship was otherwise good.
In this way, the MCCs give Buyers a blank permission slip to unilaterally
wipe their hands clean of any suspected human rights violation, even if
their own hands were not clean, and even if destroying the contractual
relationship could cause further harm to workers. Indeed, workers
could be harmed if they are put out of a job, or if factory managers move
to squelch workers’ associational rights to stop word of human rights
abuses from getting out.
MCC 2.3 creates additional penalties for Suppliers suspected of
having breached Schedule P:

71. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1099 n.26 (clarifying that “Avoidance”
applies to agreements under the CISG, whereas “Cancellation” applies to contracts
under the U.C.C., hence the bracketed options).
72. Id. at 1099 (emphasis added).
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Noncompliance with Schedule P [substantially impairs the value of the
Goods and this Agreement to Buyer] [is a fundamental breach of the
entire Agreement] and Buyer may immediately [cancel] [avoid] this
entire Agreement with immediate effect and without penalty and/or
may exercise its right to indemnification and all other remedies.73

Under this clause, a suspected breach of Schedule P triggers not only
the right of the Buyer immediately to cancel this and all of its contracts
with the Supplier—without any penalty for cancelling even
unproblematic contracts—but also triggers the Buyer’s right to seek
damages beyond cancelation, including by activating the
indemnification clause, which we return to below.
MCC 2.5 states, “Supplier hereby acknowledges that it shall have no
right to cure by substitution and tender of Goods created and/or
delivered without violation of Schedule P if Buyer elects to refuse such
tender, in Buyer’s sole discretion.”74 This clause says that the Supplier
will have no opportunity to address or correct the (suspected) human
rights violation; one strike and you’re out, in other words. This
approach is problematic for a few reasons, including because it is
entirely inconsistent with the approach of the UNGPs and the OECD
Guidelines.75 These widely adopted principles, which, it is important
to stress, were developed with substantial input from transnational
corporations, promote collaboration and remediation over retaliation,
contractual or otherwise.76 Indeed, the famous “three pillars” of the
UNGPs include, the nation state’s responsibility to protect human
rights, the business responsibility to respect human rights, and the joint
responsibility to remedy.77 What form could remediation take in a
scenario where the Buyer suspects that a violation has occurred at the
Supplier level? Well, for a start, the Buyer would be expected to work
with the Supplier to create an internal grievance mechanism to address

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1100.
75. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9; OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 9.
76. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9, princ. 13(b) (“The responsibility to
respect human rights requires that business enterprises . . . (b) seek to prevent or
mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations,
products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed
to those impacts.”); OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 19–20 (“Enterprises should . . .
seek to prevent or mitigate an adverse impact where they have not contributed to that
impact, when the impact is nevertheless directly linked to their operations.”).
77. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9, princ. 13(b).
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the workers’ (or their representatives’) complaints.78 The mechanism
would operate to, for example, pay workers any unpaid overtime wages
and change internal procedures so that the conditions that gave rise to
the grievances can be improved going forward. It could lead to the
firing of managers who have squelched the rights of whistleblowers or
of workers to associate. It could also involve instituting new procedures
to improve communications between the Buyer and the Supplier.
Through the no right to cure clause, the MCC project unnecessarily
undermines the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines, as well as the
consensus-driven process that led to their development. Footnote 30
of the MCCs fairly captures the remediation approach enshrined in
the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines, but offers this option only as a
visually distant alternative to what is above the line (MCC 2.5).79 While
most of the recommendations for upgrading the MCCs appear in the
next section, one that deserves mention here is to reverse the order
between the text of MCC 2.5 and the accompanying footnote 30
placing the footnote text as the primary option above the line and the no
right to cure language as the secondary option, below the line. As
Professor Diane Orentlicher pointed out in her remarks at the New
Perspectives: A Discussion on Modern Global Supply Chains Symposium,
the way in which the MCCs present contractual options to Buyers serves a
signaling function, and the current order sends the signal that retaliation,
not remediation, should be the first port of call.80 If the proposal of

78. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9, princ. 29 (“To make it possible for grievances
to be addressed early and remediated directly, business enterprises should establish or
participate in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and
communities who may be adversely impacted.”); OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 34.
Once there is a need for remediation, “operational-level grievance mechanisms for those
potentially impacted by enterprises’ activities can be an effective means of providing for
such processes when they meet the core criteria of: legitimacy, accessibility, predictability,
equitability, compatibility with the Guidelines and transparency, and are based on dialogue
and engagement with a view to seeking agreed solutions.” Id.
79. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1100 n.30 (“Many parties, however, may
prefer to provide a right to cure . . . the parties may prefer to institute a program to alleviate
the problems (e.g., by providing for appropriate working conditions) rather than to end
the Agreement and throw the employees out of work. For these reasons, a ‘notice and
cure’ clause may be preferable to the elimination of any cure right for Supplier.”).
80. Diane Orentlicher, Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, Remarks at the
American University Law Review Symposium: New Perspectives: A Discussion on
Modern Global Supply Chains (Jan. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Orentlicher Remarks].
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reversing the order is unpalatable, then at a minimum the text of footnote
30 should be added above the line as a (preferably first) bracketed option.81
Finally, for purposes of sizing the Buyer’s stick under the MCCs,
MCC 5.6 seals all remaining outs for the Supplier, stating:
Supplier shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Buyer . . . against
any and all losses, damages, liabilities, deficiencies, claims, actions,
judgments, settlements, interest, penalties, fines, costs or expenses of
whatever kind, including, without limitation, the cost of storage, return,
or destruction of Goods, the difference in cost between Buyer’s
purchase of Supplier’s Goods and replacement Goods, reasonable
attorneys’ fees, audit fees, and the costs of enforcing any right under
this Agreement or applicable law, in each case, that arise out of the
violation of Schedule P by Supplier or any of its Representatives. This
Section shall apply, without limitation, regardless of whether claimants
are contractual counterparties, investors, or any other person, entity, or
governmental unit whatsoever.82

This clause is designed to shield the Buyer from having to pay damages
to anyone bringing a lawsuit against it as a result of a human rights
violation at the Supplier level. The Supplier would indemnify the
Buyer by taking full responsibility for any and all claims brought
against the Buyer, whether by workers, consumers, investors, other
businesses, or the government. This is a sweeping indemnification
clause that ignores the Buyer’s role in creating the conditions on the
ground for human rights violations to occur. What explains this
degree of Buyer bias, especially given the high probability that the
81. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, ¶ 5.3 does speak to non-compensatory
remedies for Buyers, including asking Suppliers to provide adequate assurances of
Schedule P compliance; demanding injunctive relief to stop the non-compliance;
requiring the Supplier to terminate certain employees or subcontracts; and,
suspending payments during the Buyer’s investigation of the Schedule P breach.
However, this MCC does not go far enough in terms of putting remediation first or
countering the retaliatory approach advanced in the other MCCs. For a start, MCC
5.3 is difficult to reconcile with MCC 2.5 (no right to cure), which comes earlier in the
ABA Report. Could non-compensatory remedies be sought if the Supplier has no right
to cure? More words are needed to integrate these two clauses. Further, MCC 5.3
does not recommend non-compensatory remedies as a default, it merely lists them as
“[i]n addition to the right to [cancel] [avoid] this Agreement” possibilities. Moreover,
the content of MCC 5.3 is not sufficiently reflective of the UNGPs or the OECD
Guidelines to offer Buyers a recognizable point of reference for remediation. Finally,
the remedial focus of MCC 5.3 remains squarely on the Supplier and says nothing of
the Buyer’s responsibility to remediate human rights abuses in its supply chain, again,
contrary to the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines.
82. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, ¶ 5.6.
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Supplier will turn out to be judgment proof? Likely the answer is that
the bigger the (even unusable) stick, the more probable it is that
Suppliers will be vigilant about complying with Schedule P.
Contracting to make Suppliers more vigilant about human rights is
no doubt a good thing. But, when taken together, MCCs 2.2., 2.3, 2.5,
and 5.6 create such stiff penalties for a breaching Supplier that they
will likely do whatever they can to avoid detection by concealing any
deviation from Schedule P. Put another way, when the consequences
of detection are as elevated as they are here, the incentives to avoid
detection at all costs are also heightened. Perversely, then, the MCCs
could create an over-deterrence dynamic that leads to more human
rights violations, not fewer. The MCCs would be much stronger if they
adopted a collaborative, remediation-oriented model, rather than a
retaliatory model. After all, the victims of human rights violations are
the workers and what they need to be made whole is remediation, not
contractual retaliation. Yet, as currently drafted, the MCCs treat the
Buyer as the victim and equip them with a stick so large that even its
hypothetical wielding could cause more harm than good to those in
need of protection—workers. This is a most unfortunate outcome of
the MCCs’ Buyer bias. To correct course, the true victims of human
rights abuses in the supply chain must move from the wings to center
stage; otherwise, the integrity of this important and valuable initiative
will be grossly undermined. This point will be returned to in Part III.
A last critical observation pertains to the MCCs’ agnosticism
concerning Schedule P. There are definite advantages to staying away
from prescribing specific Schedule P content, including that this
flexibility invites Buyers to engage in the important exercise of
determining what human rights policies matter most to them given
their particular circumstances. But there are also disadvantages to
agnosticism in this setting. Specifically, without some degree of
Schedule P uniformity, production could become even more
expensive for Suppliers who will be contractually obligated to comply
with human rights standards that differ from Buyer to Buyer.83
Typically, compliance costs are assumed by the Supplier, not the Buyer,
and, without encouragement—for example, from the ABA—to
proceed otherwise, it is unlikely that these costs will be passed on to
the Buyer since that would make the Supplier less competitive.
Moreover, price pressures are today greater than ever, meaning that to
83. ETI Report, supra note 59, at 7 (addressing the issue of high ethical demands
being made on suppliers with little to no support from buyers).
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be competitive, Suppliers must charge lower prices than ever.84 It is
not difficult to see how this cocktail of increased production costs and
lower prices could incentivize more cost-cutting by Suppliers, and thus
lead to more human rights abuses. To mitigate this risk, it is once again
important to cultivate a more collaborative relationship between
Buyers and Suppliers. The more Buyers can harmonize the content of
Schedule P (perhaps according to their industry?) the more financially
feasible it will be for Suppliers to comply, and the greater the
likelihood that they will in fact comply.
The capital “S” solution is therefore not to retaliate against Schedule
P breaching Suppliers, but rather to improve the Buyer-Supplier
relationship in order to increase collaboration in protecting human
rights all along the supply chain. Implementing this Solution will
require finding ways to make Buyers take more responsibility for their
own behavior under the supply agreement and placing the actual
victims of human rights abuses—the workers—at the contractual center
stage. As currently drafted, the MCCs tend to entrench separation, and
even opposition, between Buyers and Suppliers. This approach comes at
the unfortunate cost of jeopardizing the effectiveness and integrity of the
MCCs as a tool for protecting human rights in the supply chain. Part III
offers some recommendations for correcting course.
III. MAKING BETTER CONTRACTS BY
MAKING THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BETTER
Part II of this Article cast light on the central shortcoming of the
MCCs, that they are too biased in favor of the Buyer and that they
overlook the real and frequent reality that Buyers are deeply
implicated in creating the conditions that make human rights
violations possible. Furthermore, the MCCs create so much contractual
room and cover for Buyers to engage in irresponsible purchasing
practices that they could inadvertently generate an increase the
occurrence of human rights violations. For these and other reasons, it is
imperative to correct course in order to protect the hugely valuable
contributions that the ABA’s initiative is making to the business and human
rights space and to improve its chances of transformational success.
The recommendations that follow seek to make the supply
agreement a more robust instrument for improving the human rights
conduct of both Suppliers and Buyers. This could be achieved by

84. Padmanabhan et al., supra note 19.
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making both parties subject to Schedule P and activating their
respective human rights obligations contractually at the outset of their
contractual relationship. On the back end, the MCCs could be
adjusted to hold both parties accountable for human rights violations,
to the extent of their respective fault. This Part thus offers
recommendations for recalibrating the MCCs under two general
categories: ex ante contractual regulation and ex post contractual
regulation. The first set of recommendations focuses on regulating
the conduct of the parties before the occurrence of a human rights
violation, while the second focuses on regulating the conduct of the
parties after such an occurrence.
A. Ex Ante Contractual Regulation
The recommendations in this Section aim to reformulate the MCCs
so that they can better fulfill their mission to protect human rights in
the supply chain. The focus here is on improving the Buyer-Supplier
relationship at the outset.
In this regard, a first recommendation is to relax some of the
agnosticism with respect to the content of Schedule P. Simply, the
Introduction to the ABA Report, which currently serves as a kind of
preamble for the MCCs, should be expanded by a few sentences to
highlight that it is crucially important for Buyers to adopt a “do no
harm” commitment that is rooted in sound purchasing practices.
Buyers should make their employees aware of this commitment and
provide appropriate training. More specifically, employees staffed on
the Buyer’s purchasing team should be trained on sound purchasing
practices and on navigating possibly conflicting directives coming from
their superiors. This would help ensure that ethical commitments do not
get sidelined in the hunt for the best deal and to mitigate the silo problem
identified by the ETI and others.85 This additional language should get
Buyers thinking about what they can do to improve their own human
rights performance, independently of Suppliers.
Going further, the Introduction could suggest that Buyers,
particularly those engaged in less sophisticated industries with lower
switching costs, expressly include responsible purchasing commitments
in their human rights policy, and, by extension, in Schedule P. Buyers
could also be referred to documents such as the ABA Model Business
and Supplier Principles on Labor Trafficking and Child Labor (which

85. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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include principles for Buyers),86 the ETI Report (which contains a
sample Buyer code of conduct),87 and of course, the UNGPs88 and the
OECD guidance on due diligence for responsible supply chains in the
garment and footwear sector,89 all of which provide guidance for
drafting a responsible Buyer policy.
If Buyers’ responsible buying commitments are included in
Schedule P, the next question becomes, how to operationalize them
contractually. As already mentioned, under the current MCCs,
Schedule P is binding only on Suppliers, not Buyers.90 To correct this
imbalance, a new MCC in the representations and warranties section
could be drafted to say, for instance, that with every order submitted
to the Supplier, the Buyer warrants that, in accordance with
Schedule P, it has taken the Supplier’s production capacity into
account in finalizing the terms. Another MCC could be added to this
section, saying that the Buyer will support the Supplier’s efforts to
comply with Schedule P to the extent reasonable for similarly situated
Buyers. This clause would kill two birds with one stone. First, it would
more equitably apportion the technical and financial responsibility for
complying with Schedule P, which is important since Supplier
production costs rise when different Buyers impose different human
rights standards and requirements; and, when costs rise, so too do the
incentives for cutting compliance corners. Second, the “similarly
86. ABA, MODEL BUSINESS AND SUPPLIER POLICIES ON LABOR TRAFFICKING AND CHILD
LABOR 4, 6–8 (2014).
87. ETI Report, supra note 59, at 4 (defining responsible purchasing as “purchasing
in a way that enables positive change at the supplier level, so that every part of the
supply chain benefits. It requires a trusting, direct and honest relationship where both
parties are able to negotiate and share risks equally, and a purchaser who is committed
to supporting human rights within the supply base”). The ETI buyer code of conduct
contains ten provisions, including: “Communicating clearly, promptly and accurately
on all issues concerning orders”; “Never negotiating a price that is below the cost of
production, as this will impact on the wages and working conditions of workers”;
“Staying with our current supplier if a higher price will ensure decent wages and
working conditions for workers, rather than moving our business elsewhere purely on
the basis of price”; “Placing orders with lead times that do not trigger excessive working
hours or sub-contracting”; “Refraining from changing orders repeatedly and with
short notice. If changes are unavoidable, amending target delivery times accordingly”;
and “Providing material and practical support to our suppliers in striving to meet their
obligations under this code of conduct.” Id. at 31.
88. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9, princ. 16.
89. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR
RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS IN THE GARMENT AND FOOTWEAR SECTOR 37 (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264290587-en [hereinafter OECD GARMENT GUIDANCE].
90. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1096.
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situated” language would help address the industry differentiation issue—
that different industries involve different Supplier-Buyer dynamics—by
tacking the Buyer’s support to the practices and usages within its own
trade. These clauses could be added (even only as bracketed options) to
the representations and warranties section, in order to signal to Buyers
that their behavior matters for protecting human rights.
A last ex ante recommendation is to add another clause to the
representations and warranties section allowing the Supplier and
workers to report not only existing human rights violations (as
stipulated in MCC 1.3), but also any potential violations that could
materialize as a result of problematic Buyer behavior. This would serve
as an alert system, signaling to the Buyer that the Supplier is entering
a human rights “danger zone” and that the Buyer can help by
returning to the negotiating table, or perhaps just by making a phone
call. Going a bit further, perhaps a third party, such as the ETI, could
be designated in the contract to receive the Supplier’s alerts and to
mediate between the Buyer and the Supplier, before the identified
human rights risk materializes into a violation.
B. Ex Post Contractual Regulation
This set of recommendations aims to reformulate the MCCs so as to
improve the behavior of Buyers and Suppliers after a human rights
violation has occurred. More specifically, the proposals below would have
the MCCs direct the parties to remediate human rights violations,
rather than engage in contractual retaliation. This would address the
problem discussed in Part II, that by steering the Buyer in the direction
of retaliation, the MCCs undermine both the remediation principles
enshrined in the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines91 and the MCCs’
own mission to ameliorate human rights in global supply chains.
As currently drafted, the MCCs adopt a dangerously punishing
stance toward breaching Suppliers. Dangerous because, as discussed
above, the fear of being caught breaching Schedule P could cause
Suppliers to push production deeper into the shadows of illicit
subcontracting, where workers’ human rights are most at risk. The
retaliatory approach is also problematic in that it asks far less of Buyers
than the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines in terms of taking
responsibility for the human rights violations that occur in their supply
chains. The UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines, along with other widely
91. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9, princ. 22; OECD GARMENT GUIDANCE,
supra note 89, at 72–73.

1550

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1519

adopted norms such as the Global Compact, all converge on the notion
that, in the event of a human rights violation, the first step should be for
the businesses involved, namely, the Buyer and the Supplier, to
remediate the grievances of the victims—the workers—and to address
the root causes of the violations. Although these documents contain
only voluntary norms, not binding rules, they are widely regarded as
influential and legitimate, in large part due to the consensus-driven
process that led to their development.92 The remediation directive
should therefore be taken seriously, yet it conflicts quite dramatically
with the retaliatory approach adopted by the MCCs.
A first recommendation in this section is to add language to the
MCCs and the Introduction indicating to Buyers that they should
consider the obligations enshrined in the UNGPs and the OECD
Guidelines as a normative floor, not a ceiling. To bring this message
home, the MCCs should further communicate that remediation—not
retaliation—is the first post-violation port of call.93 As recommended
in Part II, this could be achieved simply by moving the text of footnote
30 above the line, under a new “Right to Cure” section. Ideally, the
current “No Right to Cure” language would be removed altogether,
but it could also be moved below the line. If neither option is
palatable, then the current language should at a minimum be
bracketed to signal that it contains only a contractual option, not a
default. Moving the remediation text above the line would send a
much clearer signal to Buyers that remediation is a good first option.
Additionally, an entirely new section could be inserted between Section
2 (“Rejection of Goods and [Cancellation] [Avoidance] of Agreement”)
92. See Parella, supra note 55, at 329 (“One of the key reasons that industry actors
were more receptive to the Ruggie Framework and the Guiding Principles compared
to the Global Norms was because of the consultation process used with the former”);
see also U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9, ¶ 4 (describing the extensive research
conducted, consultations, submissions, and reports generated); U.N. Office of the
High Commissioner, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive
Guide 1, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/12/02 (2012) (“The Guiding Principles are based on six
years of work by the former Special Representative, including in-depth research;
extensive consultations with businesses, Governments, civil society, affected individuals
and communities, lawyers, investors and other stakeholders; and the practical roadtesting of proposals.”).
93. This could be achieved by moving much of the content of note 30 in the Model
Contract Clauses, which discussed remediation as an option, above the line. Model
Contract Clauses, supra note 1, at 1100 n.30. Such a move would send a much better
signal to Buyer-companies than the current MCCs, which indicate that retaliation, not
remediation, is the preferable default option for buyers confronted with human rights
violations in their supply chain. See Orentlicher Remarks, supra note 80.
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and the current Section 3 (“Revocation of Acceptance”). The new
section could be titled, “Remediating Schedule P Breaches.” It could
include clauses from the UNGPs94 and the OECD Guidelines95 that
speak to setting up grievance mechanisms for victims and to addressing
the root causes of violations in the resulting remediation plan, which the
new MCC could refer to as the Joint Remediation Plan (“JRP”).
The transition to the new Section 4 could be accompanied by
language saying, “In the event that remediation is unsuccessful or that
Supplier proves unable or unwilling to meet the benchmarks set forth
in the JRP, then Buyer will have the right to exercise rejection and
termination rights as set out in this Section.” This reformulation
achieves two goals: First, it places remediation and cooperation at the
forefront of the response strategy for dealing with human rights
violations.96 Second, it preserves the Supplier’s right to cure unless and
until that party demonstrates its incapacity or unwillingness to cure, at
which point the retaliatory measures contained in the current MCCs
become more justified.
Another ex post recommendation goes to the remedies that should
be made available in the event of a Schedule P breach. Specifically,
remedies should be adjusted where the Buyer is (in whole or in part)
responsible for creating the conditions that led to the human rights
violation on the ground. The general idea is to import the concept of
contributory negligence or proportional liability from tort law into the
supply contract. Rather than use the term contributory negligence,
though, we would refer, as Professor Ariel Porat suggests, to “contributory
fault.”97 By “contorting”98 the supply agreement in this way, breaches of
Schedule P would include, not just nonconforming production processes,
but also nonconforming purchasing processes. In practical terms,
bringing contributory fault into the supply agreement would reduce any
damages payable by the Supplier to the Buyer by whatever share of the
94. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9, princ. 29.
95. OECD GARMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 89, at 94.
96. See Jennifer Martin, Private Law Remedies, Human Rights, and Supply Contracts, 68
AM. U. L. REV. 1781, 1811 (2019) (explaining that remediation and reparations for
victims have the additional advantage of avoiding the unappetizing prospect of Buyers
“benefit[ing] from a human rights abuse” by receiving large money damages).
97. Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1397,
1397 (2009).
98. Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic Analysis of
Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 390, 390 (1997) (noting that “contort,” a term
developed by Grant Gilmore, describes the gray area of law where torts and contracts
merge together).
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violation-responsibility the Buyer bears. Thus, the Buyer would be liable
under the contract, just like the Supplier.
And here is another reason to place remediation high up on the
post-violation agenda: While Buyers might (understandably) be loath
to pay human rights related damages to the Supplier, they should be
more open to paying damages into a remediation fund dedicated to
redressing the grievances of victims. Indeed, from the point of view of
all of the parties involved—the Buyers, the Suppliers, and the actual
victims—remediation should be viewed as a superior outlet for money
damages—whether paid by the Supplier, the Buyer, or both—as
compared with the prospect of one party paying the other.99 Under
the model proposed here, Buyers and Suppliers would pay the
damages resulting from their breach, in proportion to their breach,
into a JRP fund that would be disbursed to redress the grievances of
the worker victims and improve the conditions on the ground.100
To operationalize this model, an MCC should be included to
indicate that the Indemnification provision (MCC 5.6)101 cannot be
activated if the Buyer bears any responsibility for the Schedule P
violation. This makes sense: if a Buyer engages in irresponsible
purchasing practices that contribute to creating the conditions on the
ground for a violation to occur, they should not then be allowed to
offload their liability onto the Supplier or to have it otherwise
eradicated by a sweeping indemnification clause. Additionally, a
contributory fault MCC could be inserted to read: “In the event that a
breach of Schedule P is attributable to both parties, they will develop a
formula to determine what each party owes. Each party will then pay its
share of damages into the JRP fund, the proceeds of which will be used to
redress the grievances of the victims. The parties further agree that if they
are unable to reach a formula, they will work with an independent third
99. See Martin, supra note 96, at 1810 (identifying the problem that allowing a nonbreaching party to benefit financially from a human rights violation could compound
the negative reputational effect of the violation for that party and proposing a special
liquidated damages clause designed to direct compensation “to those impacted by
human rights abuses in the supply chain” rather than to the contract parties).
100. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 9, princ. 25 cmt. (“The remedies
provided by the grievance mechanisms discussed in this section may take a range of
substantive forms the aim of which, generally speaking, will be to counteract or make
good any human rights harms that have occurred. Remedy may include apologies,
restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and punitive
sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as fines), as well as the prevention
of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.”).
101. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 1, ¶ 5.6.
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party to develop one.” Note, however, that, even without such a clause, it
may be possible to activate a contributory fault mechanism through
judicial interpretation and application of fairness and equity principles.102
And there is perhaps no better justification for “contorting” the supply
agreement as proposed here than that of fairly allocating responsibility
for a human rights violation, itself a type of tort.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by highlighting two major contributions that the
ABA’s MCC project makes to the business and human rights space.
Specifically, it supplies an elegantly simple solution for putting
companies’ human rights policies into action by incorporating them
into the supply agreement. By that same contractual incorporation
device, the project begins to tear away at the problematic and outdated
distinction between product-conformity and process-conformity, thus
making room for an entirely new conception of conformity that
includes the protection of workers’ human rights.
The Article then discussed the major shortcoming of the ABA
initiative, which is that places all contractual responsibility for human
rights violations on the Supplier, ignoring the reality that Buyers who
engage in irresponsible purchasing practices play a major role in
creating the conditions for violations to occur. Furthermore, the MCCs
as currently drafted create such intense pressure on Suppliers not to get
caught that they may cause Suppliers to push production deeper into the
shadows of subcontracting where human rights risks are heightened.
The ABA Report recognizes its Buyer-friendly bias from the get-go.103
This stance is justified on the basis that the MCCs must be “legally
effective and operationally likely”104 if they are to attract a risk-averse
audience of corporate general counsels who, it is presumed, would pay
no mind to the initiative if it did not promise to reduce their exposure
to human rights liability. But this approach risks undermining the
102. Fairness considerations drive the application of other contract law doctrines, as
well, including constructive conditions and the covenant of good faith. In a future piece, I
will analyze the possibilities for using fairness doctrines as a means of fully contorting the
supply agreement to better protect human rights in global supply chains.
103. Id. at 1096–97 (“The proposed text is buyer-friendly, sometimes extremely so,
and it could be perceived by some suppliers as unduly aggressive. The drafters have
crafted the text this way because some buyers may have the leverage to use the
proposed text, and in any case, these clauses are aimed primarily at companies in the
role of buyer.”).
104. Id. at 1094.
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entire project because it converts a potentially transformative idea into
a mere risk management tool. The MCCs compromise too much and
do so unnecessarily. The UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines ask more
of Buyers than the MCCs, and the norms they promote are widely
viewed as being legitimate and worthy of compliance. As such, the
Working Group would be on solid ground if it opted to refer to these
norms as a floor, rather than a ceiling.
The piece concluded with some preliminary recommendations for
improving the MCCs in anticipation of future versions of the clauses.
The recommendations aim to make the supply agreement a more
effective tool for protecting human rights. They seek to establish a
contractual obligation for both Buyers and Suppliers to behave responsibly
from the outset of their relationship and to achieve a fairer allocation of
responsibility for remediating human rights violations that do occur.
Were these recommendations to be taken on board, the MCCs would
stand a better chance of achieving meaningful improvements in the
human rights performance of global supply chains. As expressed
throughout this Article, the ABA’s MCC project makes valuable
contributions to the business and human rights space, and any criticism
expressed here aims only to help bring those contributions to fruition.

